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Modification of the Learned-Treatise
Doctrine in New Jersey: A Necessary
Reform in Medical Malpractice Litigation
I. Introduction
For many years, New Jersey courts adhered to a restrictive rule in
determining the extent to which learned treatises should be admitted
into evidence during expert testimony.' Under that rule, a cross-
examiner was permitted to question an expert witness about the contents
of a learned treatise only if the expert conceded that the publication was
authoritative.2  In medical malpractice suits, experts' reluctance to
make such concessions placed plaintiffs at a significant disadvantage.3
A cross-examiner's ability to impeach the testimony of the opposing
party's expert was curtailed simply by the expert's denial of the
authoritativeness of the source.4
In 1992, the New Jersey Supreme Court abandoned this restrictive
rule by expressly adopting Federal Rule of Evidence 803(18), which
governs the admissibility of learned treatises during expert testimony.'
Under the Federal Rule, the authoritativeness of a source may be
established by experts other than the cross-examined witness or by
1. See New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co. v. Lehigh Zinc & Iron Co., 35 A. 915 (N.J. 1896)
(holding that counsel could use statements from scientific books to impeach opposing party's
expert witness, provided that books were standard and familiar to witness).
2. See generally N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-56,57 (Rules governing Expert and Opinion
Testimony) (West 1991). See also Ruth v. Fenchel, 121 A.2d 373 (1956), rev'd, Jacober v. St.
Peter's Medical Ctr., 608 A.2d 304 (1992). Relying on New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co., the Ruth
court permitted the plaintiff's attorney to question the defendant's expert on the contents of a
medical textbook which the expert regarded as authoritative. See Ruth, 121 A.2d at 375. For a
summary of the Ruth case, see infra text accompanying notes 45-70.
3. See, e.g., Swank v. Halivopoulos, 260 A.2d 240 (N.J. Super. 1969) (barring plaintiff's
use of medical reference book to establish that defendant had deviated from acceptable medical
standard on the ground that defendant had not conceded that the publication was authoritative).
4. Id
5. Jacober v. St. Peter's Medical Ctir., 608 A.2d 304,312 (N.J. 1992). The Federal Rules
of Evidence state:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as
a witness:
Learned Treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-
examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination, statements
contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history,
medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or
admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted,
the statements may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
Fed. R Evid 803 (18).
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judicial notice.6 Hence, expert witnesses in New Jersey no longer have
the ability to stymie cross-examination by denying that a proffered
treatise is authoritative. 7
The case that prompted the supreme court to adopt the current Rule
was Jacober v. St. Peter's Medical Center.8 Acceptance of the Federal
Rule required the court to overrule a decision that had served as
precedent for nearly forty years.9 Therefore, the newly adopted Rule
provides potential for considerable change.'"
This Comment addresses possible ramifications of New Jersey's
adoption of the Federal Rule governing the use of learned treatises
during expert testimony. Although courts invoke this Rule in cases
involving a number of areas of substantive law," this Comment
focuses primarily on the rule's relevance to medical malpractice
litigation.
Part II of the Comment traces the development of the Learned
Treatise Doctrine to provide necessary background. The purpose of this
discussion is to illustrate that the practicality of the original rule
diminished as courts confronted new questions.' 2  In Part III of the
Comment, the author discusses the Jacober decision.' 3 Part IV of the
Comment addresses the benefits of a less restrictive rule.'4 The
current Rule promotes professionalism and judicial efficiency.
Additionally, the Rule is likely impact favorably on public policy. In
Part V, the author discusses the means by which the current rule came
6. See Fed R Evid 803 (18); see also Jacober 608 A.2d at 312 (explaining provisions of
Rule). For general information concerning the Rule's application, see Schneider v. Revici, 817
F.2d 987 (2nd Cir. 1987); Tart v. Mc Gann, 697 F.2d 75 (2nd Cir. 1982); Dawson v. Chrysler
Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3rd Cir. 1980).
7. See Jacober, 608 A.2d at 308-309 (containing excerpts of testimony of expert who
refused to recognize medical treatise as authoritative). See generally Ronald B. Grayzel, The State
Supreme Court Year in Review, 1991-92, N.J L.J. (Sept 7, 1992) 6 (Describing Jacober as "a
giant step toward leveling the playing field").
8. 608 A.2d 304 (1992).
9. *See Ruth v. Fenchel, 121 A.2d 373 (1956), rev'd, Jacober v. St. Peter's Medical Ctr., 608
A.2d 304 (N.J. 1992).
10. See Grayzel, supra note 7.
11. See, e.g., Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, 591 A.2d 966,972 (N.J. Super 1991) (treating
highway safety reports as learned treatises). For information as to how the Rule has been applied
in federal courts, see United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32, 48 (2d Cir. 1978) (considering
admissibility of charts providing information on handwriting characteristics), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
931 (1978).
12. See, e.g., Jacober, 608 A.2d at 308-309. Here, the court was called upon to determine
whether an expert witness who had written articles for a treatise could deny the authoritativeness
of that publication. Id.
13. See infra pp. 14-19.
14. See infra pp. 19-23.
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into effect. 5 Specifically, the author addresses the propriety of the
Jacober court's judicial activism.
II. History of the Learned Treatise Doctrine
To appreciate the impact that the modified Learned- Treatise
Doctrine may have on future trials in New Jersey, it is advantageous to
examine the Doctrine's roots. Accordingly, the following discussion
illustrates how the former rule, which once appeared to be effective,
ultimately became impractical.
A. The Early Cases
In an 1896 action for ejectment, New Jersey's highest court was
called upon to determine the nexus between expert testimony and
learned treatises.' 6  Specifically, the court addressed the propriety of
cross-examining expert witnesses as to the contents of publications on
which the experts had not relied in forming their opinions.' 7
This question emerged in New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co. v. Lehigh
Zinc & Iron Co.'" There, an expert testified as to the feasibility of
extracting zinc from the ore in controversy during the year in which the
plaintiff had acquired title to the property.' 9 When cross-examined by
the defendant's attorney, the plaintiff's expert referred to several
15. See infra pp. 23-26.
16. See New Jersey Zinc Co., 35 A. at 915-916 (N.J. 1896). Here, the plaintiff appealed from
ajudgment for the defendant. Id. at 915. On appeal, the plaintiff filed numerous exceptions to the
admission or rejection of testimony. Id. at 916. The trial court's treatment of learned treatises
during cross-examination was not discussed extensively in the high court's opinion. See id. at 916.
However, the reviewing court briefly referred to the issue and stated that "the course adopted at
trial was right" Id at 916. Furthermore, the court's affirmance of the opinion in its entirety
constituted its acceptance of the Learned-Treatise Doctrine, as implemented by the trial court. See
id. at 917. In fact, the reviewing court expressly stated that it found "no error in the record." New
Jersey Zinc Co., 35 A. at 917.
In order to understand the significance of the lower court's ruling in New Jersey Zinc Co., it
is necessary to review the Ruth decision. See Ruth v. Fenchel, 121 A.2d at 373, 376 (N.J. 1956),
rev'd, Jacober v. St. Peter's Medical Center, 608 A.2d 304 (N.J. 1992). The Ruth opinion contains
excerpts of the trial record from the New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co. case, which are not found in the
appellate opinion in New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co. In particular, the Ruth court reprinted the
colloquy that occurred in the court room during the New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co. trial, when the
cross-examiner sought to question the plaintiffs expert witness as to statements from learned
treatises. See Ruth, 121 A.2d at 376. The trial judge stated that if a work was standard and the
witness was familiar with it, the publication would be admissible on cross-examination for
impeachment purposes. Ruth, 121 A.2d at 376. Thus, the reviewing court implicitly adopted this
rule.
17. See Ruth, 121 A.2d at 376.
18. 35 A. 915 (N.J. 1896).
19. Id
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scientific books on which he had partially relied in forming his
opinion.2" Subsequently, the defense attorney asked the plaintiff's
second expert if he recognized a particular book.2 The plaintiff
objected on the ground that the witness had not relied on or referred to
that publication on direct examination.22
This case was the first in New Jersey to address the admissibility
of scientific publications for purposes of impeachment.23 In some
other states, cross-examiners were not permitted to question expert
witnesses about the contents of books unless the experts had relied on
those books in forming their opinions. 4  Declining to adopt this
practice, the court overruled the plaintiff's objections.25 Reasoning
that the textbook might contain information that should have modified
the expert's opinion, the court decided that questions concerning the
contents of the book would be in order.26 Such questioning, however,
was contingent on two qualifications.2" First, the work had to be
standard.28  .Second, the expert had to be familiar with the
publication.29 If these criteria were not satisfied, the expert would not
be required to answer questions about the source.30 Additionally, the
reviewing court held that the lower court had acted properly in
excluding the contents of the publications as substantive evidence. 3'
20. Id. at 916.
21. Id.
22. See Ruth, 121 A.2d at 376 (containing statements made during cross-examination of
plaintiff's experts in the New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co. trial ).
23. See New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co., 35 A. 915-916. In its discussion of learned treatises
as substantive evidence, it relied on a Michigan decision. Id. at 916. See Pinney v. Cahill, 12
N.W. 862 (Mich. 1882) (holding that medical treatises may be read on cross-examination not as
proof of statements contained therein, but for impeachment' of expert's testimony, provided that
expert was familiar with work and recognized it as authority).
24. See New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co., 35 A. 915, 916. In its discussion of the concept of
learned treatises as substantive evidence, the court relied on a Michigan decision. See Pinney v.
Cahill, 12 N.W. 862 (Mich. 1882) (holding that medical treatises may be read on cross-
examination not as proof of statements contained therein, but for purpose of impeaching expert's
testimony provided that expert is familiar with works and recognizes them as authority. New
Jersey decisions concerning the admissibility of learned treatises on cross-examination list New
Jersey Zinc & Iron Co., as the case in which the state's rule originated. See e.g., Ruth, 121 A.2d
at 376 (describing New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co. as the case that decided "the law of the state").
25. See Ruth, 121 A.2d at 376-377.




30. Ruth, 121 A.2d at 377.
31. See New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co., 35 A. at 915.
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Thus, the court had created the general rule that would influence
evidentiary rulings in New Jersey for nearly a century.32 Although
scientific books were inadmissible as proof of the statements contained
therein, counsel could use such publications to impeach the testimony
of an expert witness, provided that the publication was standard and
familiar to the witness.33
In 1911, the intermediate court addressed the limits of the rule
promulgated in New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co.34  In Kingsley v.
Delaware, L. & W.R Co., 3 the court considered whether a railroad
company had been negligent in constructing a station platform. 36  To
establish that the negligent design of the defendant's car step was the
cause of the plaintiffs injuries, the plaintiffs expert testified that other
companies had constructed car steps in a different manner .3  By this
time, it was well settled that textbooks were admissible only for the
purpose of impeaching an expert witness on cross-examination.38 Yet,
on direct examination, the plaintiff attempted to introduce the source on
which his expert had relied.39 In compliance with the ruling in New
Jersey Zinc Co.4", the Kingsley court refused to admit the textbook as
substantive evidence.
The Kingsley decision was commendable. The court's proper
application of the former rule prevented an abuse of the law which
could have set dangerous precedent. As the court recognized, the role
of a treatise was to assist the trier of fact by illustrating that recognized
authorities would support the findings of the expert.42 In Kingsley, the
proffered book was not intended to support the plaintiffs testimony, but
32. See id. at 916. The court states the general rule: "Books of science are inadmissible in
evidence to prove the opinion contained in them; but, if a witness refers to them as authority, they
may be received for the purpose of contradicting him." Id. (quoting 7 Am.& Eng. Enc. Law at
513).
33. See Ruth, 121 A.2d at 376; accord Bowles v. Bourdon, 219 S.W.2d 779 (asserting that
expert witness may be questioned as to contents of treatises containing statements contradictint his
opinion if he recognizes work as standard and authoritative). But cf Oliverius v. Wicks, 187 N.W.
73 (Neb. 1922) (permitting cross-examination of expert as to statements from medical treatises
with which he was unfamiliar when another medical witness qualified work as authoritative).
34. See Kingsley v. Delaware, L. & W.R Co., 80 A.327 (1911).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 327-328.
37. Id. at 328.
38. See N.J Zinc & Iron Co., 32 A. at 916.
39. Kingsley, 80 A. at 328.
40. 35 A. 915.
41. Kingsley, 80 A. at 328.
42. For discussion of the general purposes of expert testimony, see In re Hyett, 296 A.2d
306, 313 ( N.J. 1972) (emphasizing that the role of expert is to contribute insight to his specialty
without misleading trier of fact).
98 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SUMMER 1994
was introduced as an independent source of evidence.43  The opinion
of the witness was based primarily on information that he had read; for
he had no experience in constructing railroad platforms.
44
Thus, if the court had admitted the book as substantive evidence,
further distortions of the rule might have followed as society became
more complex. Perhaps today, individuals who watched television talk
shows could represent themselves as experts on topics and then submit
transcripts of these programs in support of their opinions. In 1956, the
New Jersey Supreme Court was called upon to determine the extent to
which learned treatises were admissible in cases involving medical
questions. 45  In Ruth v. Fenchel,46 the court considered whether a
cross-examiner could confront an expert witness with statements from
publications contradicting the expert's testimony when the expert had
not based his opinion on that publication.47 In this decision, the court
reaffirmed that the law did not require the witness's reliance on the
treatise in forming his opinion.4' Rather, the appropriate inquiry was
whether the witness regarded the work as standard and authoritative.49
This inquiry later would present another issue for the courts.5 Parties
would begin to disagree as to whether a response constituted a
concession of authoritativeness.5
43. Kingsley, 80 A. at 328.
44. Id.
45. See Ruth, 121 A.2d at 377.
46. Id. at 373.
47. Id. at 375-376.
48. In Ruth, the defendant argued that cross-examining an expert witness as to statements
contained in a medical textbook was improper if the witness had not relied on the source in
forming his opinion. Id. at 375. The court rejected this reasoning. By examining excerpts of the
New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co. trial record, the court emphasized that if the work was standard and
familiar to the expert, it should be admissible. Id.
In dicta, the Ruth court quoted the decision rendered in New Jersey Zinc Co.: "If a witness
refers to [the works] as standard authority they may be received for the purpose of contradicting
him." Id. Thus, parties advocating a more conservative rule might argue that the word "refer"
should be interpreted literally. In other words, these parties would argue that the witness must,
on direct examination, refer to the source as authority for his opinion.
However, a closer reading of the two cases, conveys that an expert merely had to concede,
even implicitly, that the source was standard and authoritative. Yet, expert witnesses found
techniques to circumvent the more liberal rule, and, sometimes, they were successful. See Jacober
v. St. Peter's Medical Ctr., 608 A.2d 304, 308-310 (N.J. 1992).
49. Ruth, 121 A.2d at 376. For a similar result, cf Cooper v. Atchison, 148 S.W.2d 773
(Mo. 1941), reh 'g denied, 1941 (Rejecting contention that it was necessary for witness to agree
with the authors).
50. See, e.g., Jacober, 608 A.2d 304, 308-310 (N.J. 1992).
51. See id.
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In Ruth, the parties had been involved in an automobile
collision. 2  The defendant attempted to prove that he was not
responsible for the "whiplash" injury from which the plaintiff purported
to suffer.5 3 Because the plaintiff did not complain of neck pain until
four months after the accident had occurred, the defendant argued that
he could not have caused the injury. 4 In support of his position, the
defendant presented two expert witnesses who testified that painful
symptoms of "whiplash" necessarily manifest within a few hours of an
accident."
Upon cross-examination of the defendant's first expert, counsel for
the plaintiff produced a publication entitled Fractures, Dislocations, and
Sprains.6 When asked if he recognized the authors, the witness
responded that they were "very, very capable." '57 The witness also
stated that he had read some works by these authors but had not read
the volume in question. 8 Despite the defendant's objections, the
cross-examiner proceeded to read statements from the treatise.59 The
substance of the statements was that symptoms of a "whiplash" injury
might take years to manifest.60  The witness said that he did not
completely agree with the opinion.6'
Subsequently, the defendant's second expert described the treatise
as "an excellent textbook" and admitted that he had a copy of the book
in his library.62 In response to questions about the viewpoint espoused
by the authors, the defendant admitted that he "agree[d] in general with
the [author's] conclusions, but not the whole statement. ' 3
On appeal, counsel for the defendant argued that the trial court had
erred in permitting the plaintiff's attorney to cross-examine the expert
witnesses as to the contents of treatises on which they had not relied in
forming their opinions. 64 Pursuant to New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co., the
52. Ruth, 121 A.2d at 373.
53. Id. at 374.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 374-375.
57. Ruth, 121 A.2d at 374.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 374-375.
61. Id at 375.
62. Ruth, 121 A.2d at 374.
63. Id. at 373-374. The publication contained the following statement: "The question of
injury, whether recent or remote, is frequently slurred over by the patient for the reason that
painful symptoms do not develop until some time after, a good many times years after, the injury
occurs." Id.
64. Id. at 375.
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supreme court held that this line of questioning was indeed
appropriate.65 Because one expert had commented that the authors of
the treatise were "very, very capable," the court found that the expert
had conceded that the work was authoritative.66 Similarly, the court
interpreted the second expert's description of the treatise as "an
excellent book" as a concession of authoritativeness.6 ,
Thus, the trial court had complied fully with the rule promulgated
in New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co.6 Because the expert witness had
recognized the books as standard and authoritative, the court had ruled
properly in permitting the cross-examiner to question the witness about
the contents of the publications.69 The trial judge also had acted
appropriately by instructing the jury that the cross-examiner was using
the treatise solely to raise questions about the credibility of the
witness.70
Accordingly, the Ruth decision became precedent for New Jersey
courts in matters concerning the admissibility of learned treatises.7
Although Ruth retained this status for nearly forty years, the
disadvantages of the restrictive rule employed in the case began to
surface long before the decision was overturned.72
B. The Consequences of Requiring a Concession of Authoritativeness
Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote that "[t]he life of the law has
not been logic, it has been experience."" Perhaps this statement
accurately summarizes the the significance of the holding in Ruth.
Logic seems to have inspired the Ruth decision. By the time that Ruth
was adjudicated, it was well settled that an expert's credibility should
be determined by whether his or her findings had received the approval
of recognized authorities. When, as in Ruth, respected authorities
contradicted the expert, the trier of fact was entitled to know about the
65. Id. at 377.
66. Id.
67. Ruth, 121 A.2d at 374, 377.
68. Id. at 377.
69. Id.
70. Ruth, 121 A.2d at 375 (quoting trial judge):
"[Statements from learned treatises] are only used for the purpose of cross-examination of this
witness by counsel for the plaintiff insofar as it may or may not affect the credibility in [the
jurors'] minds as to his opinion; that is the only purpose of the reading." Id.
71. See, e.g., Swank v. Halivopoulos, 260 A.2d 240 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1969).
72. See infra text accompanying notes 80-108, 127-147.
73. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 2 (1881), reprinted in LAW AND
AMERICAN HISTORY 663 (Stephen B. Presser and Jamil S. Zainaldi eds., 1980).
74. See New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co. v. Lehigh Zinc & Iron Co., 35 A. 915 (N.J. 1986).
REFORM IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION
discrepancy.75 In 1956, the restrictions inherent in the Ruth rule might
have been practical.
The limitations on the use of treatises during cross-examination
were consistent with the arguments against their admissibility as
substantive evidence.76 Traditionally, courts excluded the contents of
treatises because their statements were not subject to cross-examination,
and, therefore, their admission into evidence would violate the hearsay
rule." Moreover, by recognizing statements from books as substantive
evidence, courts would assume the risk that the trier of fact might
misinterpret the information."' Although the rule promulgated in Ruth
was intended to benefit the trier of fact, history ultimately established
that it was the cross-examined expert who enjoyed an advantage.79
Unless the expert conceded that the publication used by the cross-
examiner was authoritative, medical literature was of little value to the
impeachment process."0  Thus, an expert had considerable control
over cross-examination.8 If questioned about an opinion that differed
from the one that he or she had articulated, the expert could stop the
inquiry simply by uttering that the source containing the conflicting
opinion was not authoritative."
In 1963, New Jersey's Supreme Court Committee on the Rules of
Evidence proposed the adoption of Rule 63(31), which was similar to
Rule 803(18) of the current Federal Rules of Evidence.83  The
75. See generally, Ruth v. Fenchel, 121 A.2d 373 (NJ. 1956).
76. See id. at 375 (explaining that learned treatises would violate the hearsay rule if offered
as substantive evidence in that written statements are not subject to cross-examination).
77. Id. See generally Grayzel, supra note 7. Texas observed a similar rule. See Seeley v.
Wentworth, 506 S.W.2d 719 (rex. Civ. App. 1974) (concluding that authoritativeness of treatise
was not established although doctor admitted to obtaining medical knowledge from source).
78. See Jacober v. St. Peter's Medical Center, 608 A.2d 304, 315-316 (anticipating similar
argument in response to current rule); see also Dolan v. Newark Iron & Metal Co., 87 A.2d 444-
446 (1952) (discussing importance of leaving determinations of admissibility of evidence to trial
judge to ensure that juries are not confused by excessive information).
79. See, e.g., Jacober, 608 A.2d 304, 308-310 (containing statements from cross-examination
that illustrate witnesses' ability to control procedure). But see, Meschino v. North Am. Drager
Inc., 841 F.2d 429, 434 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that authoritativeness of publication can be
established by other professionals, thereby illustrating that expert does not have to have such
control).
80. Grayzel, supra note 7.
81. See Whiley v. Stein, 34 S.W.2d 998, 1001 (Mo. App. 1931) (Recognizing early that
restrictive rule gave expert "veto power over the cross-examiner's efforts").
82. See infra text accompanying notes 95-106.
83. See Summary of Analysis of Significant Rule Changes, [hereinafter Summary of Analysis],
Administrative Office of the courts, p. 9. See generally NJ. Stat. Ann. 2A:84A-46 (list of rules
adopted and rejected).
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provision, however, was rejected. New Jersey courts continued to rely
on the Ruth holding. 4
In a 1966 opinion, the New Jersey Superior Court expressed
concern that the Ruth decision impeded efforts to expedite litigation".
In Myers v. St. Francis Hospital,8 6 the court discussed its years of
frustration in watching expert witnesses "not recognize or refuse to
recognize" one medical treatise after another."7 The Myers court
viewed discovery requirements as the solution. 8  Discovery
requirements might have eliminated administrative complications;
however, courts' continued reliance on the traditional rule raised another
issue which could not be disposed of so easily. 9 As a 1969 pediatric
malpractice case illustrates, the rule imposed a considerable burden on
plaintiffs.90
In Swank v. Halivopoulos,9 the plaintiff intended to use a
reference book to establish that the defendant doctor had deviated from
the proper medical standard in prescribing oxygen treatment for the
plaintiff's newborn.92 Several months after the child's birth, an
ophthalmologist determined that the child suffered from a condition
which would result in permanent blindness.93 The plaintiff had alleged
that the defendant had ordered excessive oxygen for the child and that
this error had caused the debilitating condition. 94  During cross-
examination of the defendant's expert, the plaintiff's attorney attempted
to use a treatise that supported the plaintiff's theory.9' The expert
claimed to be unfamiliar with the treatise.96 The plaintiff then sought
to have his own medical expert qualify the book as authoritative.97
84. See, e.g., Swank v. Halivopoulos, 220 A.2d 240 (1969) (stating that the proposed rule
of evidence that would admit learned treatises into evidence more liberally had not been adopted
in New Jersey).
85. See Myers v. St. Francis Hosp., 220 A.2d 693 (1966).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 701.
88. Id.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 148-155.
90. See Swank v. Halivopoulos, 260 A.2d 240 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1969).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 242-243.
93. Id. at 241. Premature infants are particularly susceptible to an eye condition known as
retrolental fibroplasia. It can be caused by excessive amounts of oxygen at or following birth.
Accordingly, extreme caution is necessary in prescribing oxygen therapy for premature infants.
David C. Cogan, M.D. and Toichiro Kuwabara, Accessory Cells in Vessels of the Paranatal
Human Retina, MD. Arch. Optalmol. (1986) 104, 741-752.
94. Swank, 260 A.2d at 241.
95. Id. it 242.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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Pursuant to state law, the court sustained the defendant's objections
because a proper foundation had not been laid.98 Unless a cross-
examiner had established that an expert witness regarded a learned
treatise as authoritative, a court would not allow questions about the
contents of the publication."
In another effort to introduce the treatise into evidence, the plaintiff
argued that the standards and recommendations contained in the book
were comparable to safety codes and should be admitted on that
ground.' The court disagreed.'0 ' The plaintiff's final attempt to
qualify the book was to analogize it to a drug brochure that listed
recommendations for dosages.'0 2  The court distinguished the
plaintiff's literature from admissible drug brochures by noting that the
plaintiff's publication contained recommendations of a more general
nature.'0 3
The facts of this case demonstrate the dilemma that plaintiffs faced.
Even if Mr. Swank's evidence had expressly stated the appropriate
standard of care, that evidence was inadmissible absent the defense
expert's concession that the source was authoritative. "' On appeal,
the plaintiff argued that the court should use additional methods of
98. Id.
99. See Swank, 260 A.2d at 242 (citing Ruth v. Fenchel, 121 A.2d 373 (NJ. 1956)).
100. Id. at 242-243. The plaintiff conceded that the book could not be admitted as a learned
treatise since neither the defendant doctor nor his experts recognized the book as authoritative. Id
For this reason, the plaintiff argued that the book was admissible "as [an] objective standard
generally recognized and accepted because representative of a consensus of opinion approved by
the profession." Id. at 243. The plaintiff further contended that the "Standards and
Recommendations of the American Academy of Pediatrics" [hereinafter, Academy Standards]
contained in the appendix of the proffered book should be admissible because the Academy
Standards were comparable to the "safety codes" held admissible in Mc Cornish v. De Soi, 200
A.2d 116 (N.J. 1964). Sank, at 242.
In Mc Comish, the court distinguished safety codes listed in industrial manuals from learned
treatises. The court explained that a safety code was "a standard of safe construction, generally
recognized and accepted as such... in the industry." Id. at 121. However, a treatise was usually
"one expert's opinion." Id.
101. Swank, 260 A.2d 243. The court determined that the Standards of the Academy were not
comparable to the industrial safety codes that were found to be admissible in Mc Comish. Id. The
safety codes presented in Mc Comish included specific instructions as to perform certain
mechanical operations. Id. Conversely, the Standards of the Academy were of a more general
nature. Id Thus, the sources were not analogous and the Standards of the Academy would not
be admissible.ld.
102. Swank, 260 A.2d at 243. Drug manufacturers' brochures forth rigid requirements as to
dosages or procedures to be followed uniformly. Id. In contrast, the Standards of the Academy
contain more general recommendations and leave the final decision to the discretion of the
physician. d.
103. Id. at 243.
104. Id.
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establishing the authoritativeness of medical treatises. 5  However,
the appellate division rejected the argument and affirmed the defense
verdict because the lower court had complied with state law.' 6
In Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, 17 a 1991 products liability case,
the appellate division conceded that the existing learned-treatise doctrine
might be unduly restrictive.' s  Although the court seemed to
recognize the doctrine's flaws, it reminded the litigants that the rule was
"of ancient lineage" and implied that it would be beyond the province
of the court to consider a more liberal standard.0 9 More time would
pass but, eventually, change would occur in this area of evidence law
in New Jersey.
C. The End of an Unduly Restrictive Era
Even before New Jersey's Learned Treatise Doctrine was
challenged in Swank and Crispin, courts in other states had begun to
question the propriety of restrictive rules governing the admissibility of
learned treatises."0 Recognizing the detrimental effects of these strict
rules, some courts adopted more liberal standards."' For instance, in
Illinois, the state's highest court held that the authoritativeness of a
learned treatise could be established by judicial notice or by an expert
witness." 2 The court reasoned that testing an expert's credibility by
the use of respected publications written for professional colleagues
would promote justice.' Thus, more liberal criteria for admitting
treatises into evidence would be appropriate.
In 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted." 4 Federal
Rule 803(18) included a provision for establishing the authoritativeness
of a learned-treatise without a concession from the opposing party."'
105. Id. at 242.
106. Id.
107. 591 A.2d 966 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991), cert. denied, 599 A. 2d 162 (1991).
108. Id.
109. Crispin, 591 A.2d at 969.
110. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 259 (Ill.
1966), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 946 (1969) (stating that the old law "serve[d] only to protect the
ignorant or unscrupulous witness"); accord Darfol v. Rhodes Co. 391 P.2d 321 (Wash. 1964)
(holding that witness could not block cross-examination by refusing to acknowledge that work was
authoritative).
Ill. Id. at 253.
112. Id. at 259.
113. Id.
114. Fed R. Evid, 28 U.S.C.A. (West 1984).
115. Fed R Evid. 803 (18). See supra note 5. For an analysis of the Rule's impact, see James
W. Mc Elhaney, Learned Treatises, 12 Litig. 39-40, 54-55 (1986).
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Consequently, states that had adopted the Federal Rules were becoming
more progressive in their approaches to admitting learned treatises into
evidence during cross-examination." 6  Meanwhile, New Jersey
continued to invoke its conservative rule. "
7
In June of 1991, New Jersey's Supreme Court Committee on the
Rules of Evidence compiled a report on its recommendations for
changes in the state's rules of evidence."' The Committee proposed
the adoption of the federal numbering system as a structural
change." 9 Additionally, the Committee recommended a number of
substantive changes to the existing rules. 2  Among the proposed
rules was a provision comparable to the federal rule governing learned
treatises.'2 ' The proposed New Jersey law was practically identical
to its federal counterpart.'22 The decision was scheduled to be
announced on September 15, 1992."' Interestingly, the court that had
strictly observed the rule promulgated in Ruth for so many years did not
wait for the rules to be adopted by statutory mechanism. 24 Two
months before the current rules of evidence were approved, the New
Jersey Supreme Court overruled Ruth in Jacober v. St. Peter's Medical
Center.
25
116. See, e.g., Briggs v. Chicago G.W.R. Co., 57 N.W.2d 572, 583 (Minn. 1953) (holding that
witness's statement that "the authorities" supported his views permit impeachment by publication
expressing contrary view, if expert recognized publication). But see Minn. R Evid, 803 (18)
(Minnesota adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1977).
117. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mountainside Hospl, 318, 326 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990)
(preculding malpractice plaintiff from introducing learned treatise as substantive evidence).
118. Jacober, 608 A.2d at 314. See also Summary of Analysis (discussing changes in the
rules).
119. Memorandum: Administrative Offices of the Courts, Sept. 15, 1992.
120. See generally Summary of Analysis.
121. See Report of the Supreme Court Committee on the Rules of Evidence [hereinafter, Report
of Committee on the Rules], reprinted in N.J L.J at 1, 34-39 (October 10, 1991); see also
Summary of Analysis, 9-11. The Committee consisted of judges, prosecutors, private defense and
public defense counsel, and New Jersey law professors. Id. The Committee endeavored to revise
the rules in a manner that would represent what it perceived as "the best of the 1967 Rules of
Evidence and the 1975 Rules of Evidence as amended." Id. The changes are not drastic. In fact,
even before the revision, there was considerable similarity between the two sets of rules. Id. In
some cases, the New Jersey law took precedence over its federal counterpart. Some rules were
expanded; others were narrowed; and, in some circumstances, the language of the provisions
changed slightly. Id.
122. See Fed R Evid. 803 (18). See supra note 5.
123. See Jacober
124. See Jacober; see also Summary of Analysis On September 15, 1992, the proposed rules
were delivered to Governor James Florio, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the
General Assembly. The rules would become effective on July 1, 1993, provided that they were
not, in whole or in part, canceled by a joint resolution by the Senate and General Assembly and
signed by Governor Florio. Summary of Analyss,
125. Jacober v. St. Peter's Medical Center, 608 A.2d at 315 (asserting that the "case presents
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III. The Jacober Decision
In July of 1992, the court reviewed Jacober v. St. Peter's Medical
Center, a case that tested the limits and logic of the Ruth holding.'26
By 1992, expert witnesses had become adept in the stonewalling
techniques used to block cross-examination. 127  Apparently, the
experts for the defendants in Jacober were no exception.12  The
experts successfully inhibited cross-examination by denying the
authoritativeness of the publications to which opposing counsel
referred. 129 A summary of the circumstances precipitating the lawsuit
will provide background information pertinent to the events that
transpired during the Jacober trial.
In 1981, the plaintiff was born prematurely. 30 At 25 to 28
weeks, and a birth weight of one pound, ten ounces, his chances for
survival were slim.' 3 ' In order to monitor the patient's blood gases,
the defendant doctors attempted to insert a catheter into the infant's
aorta via the umbilical artery.' 32 Apparently, the child did not
respond favorably to the catheterization. '3' A nurse's notes indicated
that after three attempts at the procedure, the baby suffered from
diminished circulation. 34 As a result, the toes on his right foot were
self-amputated from gangrene.'
As the infant grew, his legs grew unevenly.'36 By the time that
the child was ten, his right leg was misshapen and six inches shorter
than his left leg.' One doctor predicted that when the child stopped
growing, there would be a twelve inch discrepancy in the length of his
legs. 38  This condition might necessitate amputation.'39  By his
guardians ad litem, the child filed the lawsuit that reached the supreme
court in 1992. 4°
compelling context for adoption of the federal learned treatise rule").
126. 608 A.2d 304 (N.J. 1992).
127. See Thomas A. Moore, N.Y L.J at 3, (Dec. 4, 1990).
128. See Jacober, 608 A.2d at 308-309 (Reviewing testimony given at trial).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 306.
131. Id.
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At the trial, the plaintiff's attorney attempted to use two treatises
to support his allegations that the defendants had deviated from the
acceptable medical standard by using a catheter that was too large for
an infant weighing less than 1500 grams. 4' The plaintiff's attorney
asserted that the defendants' use of that catheter had caused the child's
injury. 42 When the plaintiff's attorney sought to cross-examine the
defendants' experts as to the contents of these publications, the court
prohibited the inquiry.'43 On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the
trial court had erred in disallowing cross-examination of the defendants'
experts as to statements contained in the two medical treatises."'
The evidence was convincing. It was consistent with testimony
provided by the plaintiffs expert, who claimed that the defendants
should have used a 3.5 catheter instead of the 5.0 one that was
inserted.'45 Moreover, one author had acknowledged a nexus between
catheter size and discoloration of a limb, which the plaintiff had
experienced. 46  Yet, under Ruth, this information would be
admissible only if a defendant conceded that the relevant treatises were
authoritative.'47
Upon cross-examination, the plaintiff questioned two experts and
one of the defendants about the proffered text. None of the witnesses
would declare that the text was authoritative. 48 One doctor said
"[ilt's a standard text, but I don't think it's authoritative."'' 49  The
witness further stated that a textbook is the opinion of a single writer
and subject to constant revision.' Therefore, he did not think that
textbooks should be perceived as authority.' l  Furthermore, the
141. Id. at 308.
142. Jacober, 608 A.2d at 306-307. For background information on the effects of catheterizing
infants, see Beverly C. Morgan, M.D., Complications From Intravascular Catheters; Primum Non
Nocere, Am. J. Dis. Child at 138, 425-426 (1984); Sidney N. Randel, M.D. et al., Experience with
Percutaneous Indwelling Peripheral Arterial Catheterization in Neonates, Am. J. Dis. Child at 141,
848-849 (1987).
143. Jacober, 608 A.2d at 307-308.
144. Id. at 310. The proffered textbook stated that the discoloration of a limb is "directly
related to the relative size of the catheter in the aorta." Id. at 307 (quoting Dr. L. James Stanley,
Emergencies in the Delivery Room, Neonatal-Perinatal Medicine 127, 138 (1977)).
145. Id. at 306-307.
146. Id. at 307.
147. See Ruth v. Fenchel, 121 A.2d 373.
148. Id. at 309.
149. Jacober, 608 A.2d at 308.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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witness denied that researchers had addressed the link between catheter
size and probability of injury.'52
Interestingly, the second expert also disputed that the textbook was
standard and authoritative, although he had written articles for an earlier
edition of the same publication.' 53 At one point, the expert stated that
the author of one of the proffered treatises was "a very eminent
neonatologist. ' '5 4  Yet, he refused to characterize the source as
authoritative. 155
At first, it may appear that the Jacober trial merely exemplified
that the battle of the experts was commonplace in malpractice
litigation.'56  The plaintiff stated one proposition, the defendant
espoused the opposite view, and the jury had to decide who was more
convincing. Yet, the issues in this case were not limited to questions
about differing medical standards. Jacober raised concerns about
accountability.
From the plaintiff's perspective, the unavailability of two of the
defendants further complicated the trial.'57  These individuals,
however, had given depositions.'58 One deponent, a doctor, submitted
that she did not recall what size catheter she had used.'59
Nevertheless, the doctor acknowledged that at the hospital, it was
textbook procedure to use a 3.5 catheter on infants weighing less than
1500 grams."6 When counsel for the plaintiff began to read from the
textbook to which the doctor had referred, the court asserted that
applicable rule of evidence did not permit such conduct.' 6'
To no avail, the plaintiff attempted to convince the court that this
situation was distinguishable because the deposition of a defendant
revealed that a particular textbook provided the binding medical




153, Id at 308-309.
154. Jacober, 608 A.2d at 309.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Wilson v. Stilwill, 309 N.W. 898 (Mich. 1981) (describing typical malpractice
case); see also Lake v. Clark, 533 So. 2d 797, 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (acknowledging in
a medical malpractice case, the "battle of the experts" was practically inevitable).




161. Id. at 309-310.
162. Jacober, 608 A.2d at 310.
163. Id.
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The trial court had construed Ruth narrowly.' For some reason,
perhaps because of the language in the Ruth holding, the trial court did
not perceive the defense experts' comments as a concession of
authoritativeness.'65 Although the Ruth opinion stated that an expert
must "admit" that a treatise was authoritative, it was well settled that
cross-examination was permissible when an expert acknowledged a
work's attributes.' Irrespective of the witnesses' carefully chosen
words, they had "implicitly conceded" the authoritativeness of the
books.'67 The high court found that the trial court's exclusion of
contents of the learned treatises had prevented jurors from making an
accurate determination of the defense experts' credibility.'
Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed and
remanded for a new trial.'
69
In addition to arguing that the trial court had misapplied the rule
established in Ruth, the plaintiff also contended that rule should be
modified so that experts could not continue to block cross-examination
by refusing to acknowledge the authoritativeness of learned
treatises. 7 ' Hence, the supreme court did not stop at correcting the
lower courts' error. Recognizing that this scenario surely would repeat
itself, the supreme court adopted the Federal Rule of Evidence
governing learned treatises."'
IV. A More Progressive Era
The current Rule's attributes include its potential to promote
professionalism and a more efficient judicial process. Additionally, the
164. Id. at 316.
165. See Ruth, 121 A.2d 373. The syllabus states: "[Alithough medical experts testifying did
not rely on treatise in forming opinion, where they admitted that treatise was recognized and
standard authority on subject, it was proper to permit cross-examination of experts in regard to
treatise at variance." Id. (emphasis added).
166. See id. at 374 (concluding that witness's description of authors as "very, very capable"
constituted concession of authoritativeness).
167. Jacober, 608 A.2d at 311. Cf Eckleberry v. Kaiser Found. N. Hosps., 359 P.2d 1090,
1093-1094 (holding that expert's statement that a textbook was "commonly used" constituted a
concession of authoritativeness); accord Batson v. Batson, 117 So. 10 (Ala. 1928) (witness's
description of a source as "a bit old but recognized as a good book" rendered the book
authoritative for cross-examination purposes).
168. See Jacober, 608 A.2d at 311; see also Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269,275 (1949)
(reasoning that it would be illogical to allow witnesses to provide expert knowledge based on book
knowledge and then preclude the opposing party from interrogating them about conflicting
opinions by other recognized authorities).
169. Jacober, 608 A.2d at 316.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 315-316.
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abandonment of the strict rule imposed by the Ruth court is conducive
to the development of favorable public policy. Despite its merits, the
current rule has some negative aspects. These disadvantages, however,
are minor in comparison to the Rule's potential to effect positive
change.
A. Professionalism and Judicial Efficiency
Fortunately, the current rule can curtail the courtroom antics that
occurred when adversary parties were required to concede that
publications were authoritative."" Under the former rule, the
evasiveness displayed by the defendants in Jacober was not
uncommon. 173  One critic of the old rule described the appalling
conduct that the strict standard invited:
THEY COME TO COURT, reciting a litany of qualifications,
teaching experience, lists of writings in professional journals, and
when confronted with the best recognized textbooks in the field they
will not accept them as authoritative.
When asked whether they recognize those same books that
they have been teaching from and referring to over the years, they
say that 'no textbook is authoritative.' Apparently, it is fine that
medical students can learn the standards and practices of their
profession from these books so they can treat patients, but when it
comes to the courtroom, somehow, they are just not good
enough.1
7 4
Now that expert witnesses have lost the opportunity to influence the
selection of treatises used in cross-examination, such antics should
occur less frequently. Moreover, lawyers seeking to qualify treatises as
authoritative no longer will prolong trials with time consuming
techniques implemented to counter stonewalling. '7-
172. See generally Moore supra note 127 at 3. For example of another complication that
resulted in the absence of a liberal rule, see Ramage v. Central Ohio Emergency Serv., Inc., 592
N.E.2d 828 (Ohio 1992). There, the court permitted a cross-examiner to question plaintiff s
witness as to whether he agreed with statements in book by a potential expert. Id. at 828. The
court reasoned that the statements were not substantive evidence, but the questioning was
permissible in anticipation of live testimony by opposing party's expert. Id. The case provides
another good argument for adoption of the Federal Rule governing the use of learned treatises. Id.
Because the rule is less restrictive, it provides less opportunity for manipulation and inconsistent
application.
173. Moore, supra note 127.
174. Id. at 3.
175. Id. See Moore advises cross-examiners to employ various techniques to impede the
efforts of a "stonewaller." Id. For instance, Moore suggests producing a number of texts on a
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If one were to consider the objectives of the impeachment process,
the traditional rule would seem anomalous. 76 Impeachment serves
to guarantee fair treatment to the opposing parties, to permit accurate
evaluation of expert testimony, and to allow a more expedient trial. 77
The current Rule is more consistent with these purposes.
Under the current Rule, treatises also may be introduced as
substantive evidence during both direct and cross-examination.178
This change also has merit. Historically, judges instructed juries that
statements from publications were to be considered only in determining
the expert's credibility and not as statements of proof an expert's
conclusions.'79 Realisically, it was difficult for jurors to disregard an
authority's statement that parroted or contravened an expert's
opinion."' Therefore, the current Rule enables the jury to function
more effectively. Because jurors no longer are required to disregard the
substance of the information contained in the medical literature, they are
in a better position to comply with a judge's instructions.8  The
inherent requirement that the proffered statements support the expert's
view guards against abuses of the rule. 2
Apparently, some have expressed concern that the liberalization of
the learned treatise doctrine may induce attorneys to introduce excessive
publications into evidence.' If attorneys were to engage in this
practice, the benefit of improved judicial efficiency would be
particular subject. Each time that the attorney produces a text, he or she should ask the witness
if the source is authoritative. Id. If the witness does not concede that any book is authoritative,
then the attorney will have at least succeeded in sending a message to the jury. Id. The jury may
recognize that the witness either has little knowledge about the literature used in his profession or
is reluctant to acknowledge the authoritativeness of books that may present a contrary opinion. Id.
Additionally, Moore recommends that cross-examiners ask a doctor to name the textbooks that are
used at the hospital or medical school where he or she is employed. Id. This method of questioning
forces a witness to recognize some sources as authoritative. Id.
176. See generally 4 Marshall Hauts, Lawyer's Guide to Medical Proof, § 3000.02 (1) (1988).
177. Id.
178. Fed. R Evid. 803 (18). See supra note 5.
179. See Fed. R Evid. 803 (18) advisory committee's note. "The rule avoids the unreality of
admitting evidence for the purpose of impeachment only, with an instruction to the jury not to
consider it otherwise."
180. See Jacober, 608 A.2d at 313 (asserting that the Ruth rule was less pragmatic with
respect to the jury instruction to consider evidence exclusively for impeachment purposes).
181. Id.
182. See Fed R. Evid. 803 (18) advisory committee's note. The rule "limit[s] the use of
treatises as substantive evidence." See also Hemingway v. Ochsner Clinic, 608 F.2d 75, 78 (2nd
Cir. 1979) (ruling that publication alone does not categorize source as authoritative).
183. See Jacober, 608 A.2d at 315-316 (disagreeing with defendants' claim that "battle of the
books" will result).
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eliminated.8 4  This problem, however, is unlikely. Advocates are
more likely to rely on a few reputable books than to risk confusing a
jury with an overabundance of sources.' 85  Thus, the contention that
the current Rule promotes judicial efficiency has merit. In light of the
tremendous case loads managed by modem courts, the current Rule may
become extremely beneficial." 6
B. Policy Considerations
In recent years, the medical profession has become increasingly
concerned by the number of malpractice suits filed against its
members.' 7  Certainly, this concern is legitimate. One must
remember, however, that in addition to the frivoulous complaints filed
against doctors and hospitals, there are valid claims brought by patients
who have suffered unnecessarily because of a professional's
negligence. 8 A recognition that doctors sometimes are victims does
not obviate development in the area of patients' rights.
The current Rule provides an advantage for patients of limited
financial means.8 9 Patients who cannot afford to pay renowned
experts to contradict doctors and their experts can at least call the
court's attention to a standard reference book contradicting the
defendant's testimony. 190
To an extent, more liberal use of treatises is likely to elicit greater
accuracy in expert testimony. In hiring expert witnesses, lawyers do not
184. See, e.g., Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, 591 A.2d 966 (N.J. Super. 1991) (asserting that
under the older rule, cross-examiners came to court with numerous books and that the practice of
questioning expert as to authoritativeness of each source consumed considerable time).
185. Jacober, 608 A.2d at 316.
186. See In re Cunningham, 538 A.2d 473, 477 (Pa. 1988) (stating in dicta that case loads had
reached "unprecedented levels" in recent years).
187. See Peterson v. Hinsdale Hosp., 599 N.E.2d 84 (Ill. App. 1992) (explaining necessity of
strictly adhering to its statutory provisions for purpose of decreasing number of frivolous lawsuits).
For information pertaining to the rise in malpractice litigation, see Mary Bedikian, Medical
Malpractice Act: Michigan's Experience with Arbitration, 10 Am. J L. and Med. 287 (1984)
(discussing the "malpractice crisis of astronomical proportions" confronting Michigan and other
states and proposing arbitration as method to alleviate the burden imposed on courts as a result
of increased case load).
188. See, e.g., Mc Cann v. Baton Rouge General Hosp., 276 So. 2d 259 (La. 1973) (finding
defendant negligent for injury of patient's reproductive organs during treatment of elbow); see also
Corn v. French, 289 P.2d 273 (addressing doctor's failure to perform preliminary biopsy before
performing surgery on cancer patient); Truhitte v. French Hospital, 180 Cal. Reptr. 152 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1982) (finding that removal of sponge from patient's body was nondelegable duty of
surgeon).
189. Jacober, 608 A.2d at 315.
190. Id
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necessarily seek the most qualified candidates.' Instead, they search
for experts who will strengthen their clients' cases. 92 The likelihood
of impeachment provides an incentive for well paid experts to testify
with greater accuracy.
If one perceives New Jersey's current Rule as a mechanism
designed to allow a lawyer to prevail over a doctor, one should consider
the Rule more carefully. The Rule permits a cross-examiner to use a
medical treatise absent an expert's concession of the authoritativeness
of the work.'9 3 Medical malpractice defendants also can benefit from
a more liberal rule. For instance, if a wealthy patient produced an
influential expert, the current Rule might be advantageous to the doctor.
Finally, the current Rule may be beneficial to the patient who
cannot find an expert to testify against a particular doctor or hospital.
For some time, patient advocates have been concerned about "the
conspiracy of silence" within the medical profession.'94 The new
evidentiary rule will help to resolve some of the problems that this
"conspiracy" imposes.
V. An Examination of the Means Used by the Court
The author has attempted to illustrate the merits of the New
Jersey's current Learned-Treatise Doctrine. It now seems appropriate
191. Judge Theodore 1. Botter, The Court Appointed Impartial Expert, in Using Experts in
Civil Cases, (Melvin D. Kraft 2d ed., 1982).
192. Id. See Trower v. Jones, 520 N.E. 297 (III. 1988) (allowing questioning of expert as to
the frequency of his work as medical witness because expert's financial interest in case is relevant
to determination of "skewed opinion"); cf Wilson v. Stilwill, 309 N.W.2d 898 (Mich. 1981)
(holding that trial court did not abuse discretion in permitting cross-examiner to question expert
witness as to his involvement and interest in medical malpractice cases); accord De Haan v.
Winter, 309 N.W. 898, 902 (Mich. 1933) (announcing that for the purpose of affecting an expert's
credibility, an expert could be cross-examined as to his interest in the case in terms of contribution
or compensation).
193. See Jacober v. St. Peter's Medical Ctr., 608 A.2d at 304 (N.J. 1992).
194. See Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 181 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. 1970). In an action for
wrongful death, the reviewing court acknowledged the problem that courts face as a result of a
general reluctance among members of the medical profession to testify against a colleague. Id. at
885. Plaintiffs must often rely on the testimony of doctors who are engaged in other areas of
practice. Here, this was precisely the situation that occurred. The plaintiff introduced three
doctors as expert witnesses, but the doctors were not actively engaged in the relevant area of
practice. Id. Accordingly, the trial court excluded their testimony and issued a directed verdict in
favor of the defendant doctor. Id. at 886-887. However, the reviewing court found that one of the
three experts had proven to be qualified to offer expert testimony. Consequently, the exclusion
of his testimony was improper, and the court reversed the decision and ordered a new trial. For
additional discussion of physicians' unwillingness to testify against colleagues, see Crain v.
Allison, 443 A.2d 558 (App. D.C. 1981); Henning v. Parsons, 623 P.2d 574 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980);
Morgan v. Rosenberg, 370 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. 1963).
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to consider one final issue, the. question of whether the means used by
the Iacober court can be justified by the result. It would be difficult to
refute the Jacober court's finding that the trial court had misinterpreted
the Ruth standard. Conversely, some might disagree with the court's
action in substantively changing state evidence law.
Previously, in State v. D.R., 95 the supreme court reversed a
decision in which the appellate division had adopted a new exception
to the hearsay rule. 96 Specifically, the exception would allow the
court to admit into evidence a child's out of court statements regarding
sexual abuse.'97 The exception was to apply only to statements made
to a parent, confidant, physician or other professional under
circumstances providing "sufficient indicia of reliability to justify
admission.""'
The appellate division maintained that its action was appropriate
under Rule 5 of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence.'99 Rule 5 stated:
"The adoption of these rules shall not bar the growth and development
of the law of evidence in accordance with the fundamental principles to
the end that the truth may be fairly ascertained."200  The supreme
court rejected the appellate division's interpretation of Rule 5, because
a Preliminary Comment to the New Jersey Rules of Evidence stated that
courts were not to consider Rule 5 "a rule of relaxation."' 0 '
Furthermore, the supreme court reasoned that "a fundamental change in
the hearsay rule solely by judicial decision [was] inconsistent with the
procedure set forth in the Evidence Act of 1960 which involves
collaboration among the three branches of government.""2 2
Acknowledging that a new law would be in order, the supreme court
asserted that the statutory mechanism should be invoked to achieve the
desired result.20 3 Initially, it seems difficult to reconcile the two
195. 537 A.2d 667 (N.J. 1988).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 668.
199. Id.
200. D.R, 537 A.2d at 679.
201. Id. (quoting former Federal Judge Vincent Biunno).
202. Id. at 669.
203. Id. at 674-675. The court acknowledged that a modification of the hearsay rule was
necessary. Claiming that a more liberal rule would "enable the judicial system to deal more
sensibly" with prosecutions in child abuse cases, the court noted that some efforts in this area were
already in progress. Id. at 675. For information on these efforts, see id. nn. 4-6. Id. The
defendant initially confessed to the allegations, but later he retracted his statement. Id. at 668.
Other than the defendant's own statement, the victim's hearsay statements were the most
persuasive evidence. Id
REFORM IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION
supreme court decisions with respect to their notions of judicial law-
making. The Jacober court rationalized that its action was proper
because it had not established a current rule, but merely had "modiflied]
a pre-existing common-law rule of evidence." ' 4  Perhaps this
reasoning would be more convincing if the court had addressed prior
cases in which courts had stressed that modification of the learned-
treatise doctrine was the province of the legislature." 5 Still, it is
possible to reconcile the conflicting decisions, as there are two
justifications for the disparity.
First, it is significant that D.R was a criminal case. Although the
supreme court asserted that its decision rested on principles of comity,
the opinion contains language that allows the inference that rights of the
accused may have been a concern. The court stated that its reversal of
the appellate court's decision was appropriate in light of "the serious
and far-reaching nature of the rule."2 6 Moreover, the Jacober court
defended its own position by stating that modification of the learned-
treatise doctrine would not have in the "'serious and far-reaching'
consequences [of] the rule considered in D.R.
2 °7
Second, it is relevant that the proposed changes in the state's rules
of evidence were pending at the time that Jacober was argued.08 In
D.R., the court refused to effect a fundamental change in the rules of
evidence "solely by judicial decision. ' 2°  Jacober differed in the
respect that the court was not acting alone. The court simply elected to
adopt an evidentiary rule that the legislature would approve only two
months later.210
Some may criticize Jacober for its precedential effect.
Specifically, some may argue that Jacober provides the impetus for
future courts to engage in what is characterized as judicial legislation.
The unusual circumstances of Jacober, however, should preclude
excessively broad interpretations of the decision.
VI. Conclusion
The modification of New Jersey's Learned-Treatise Doctrine was
long overdue. Yet, it is not disputed that the prior rule once had merit.
204. Jacober, 608 A.2d at 315.
205. See, e.g., Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, 591 A.2d 966 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991), cert. denied,
599 A.2d 162 (1991).
206. D.R, 537 A.2d at 681.
207. Jacober, 608 A.2d at 315.
208. Id.
209. Jacober, 608 A.2d at 315 (emphasis added).
210. See id. at 314.
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Under the former rule, a cross-examiner could question an expert
witness as to the contents of a learned treatise provided that the witness
conceded that the source was authoritative.2 ' By rejecting the
argument that an expert witness's reliance on a treatise was crucial to
its use during cross-examination, the New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co.2 2
court and, later, the Ruth court213 enhanced a trier's ability to assess
the credibility of an expert witness. Accordingly, those courts
strengthened the truth-seeking aspect of a trial by subjecting an expert
witness's judgment to possible attacks by respected authorities.
Nevertheless, neither judges nor legislators "have [ever] been able
to construct a comprehensive, eternized set of rules anticipating all
possible legal disputes and settling them in advance."214 Accordingly,
as disputes resulted from unforeseen abuses of the old rule, it became
apparent that the rule had ceased to contribute to the "truth-seeking
aspect[] of a trial."2 5  Hence, the adoption of a less restrictive rule
was necessary.
Under the current Rule, the authoritativeness of a source may be
established by experts other than the cross-examined witness or by
judicial notice.2 16  Thus, expert witnesses cannot continue to block
cross-examination by denying the authoritativeness of a source
containing statements that contradict their testimony.217
Despite the attributes of the current Rule, some may argue that the
means used by the Jacober court cannot be justified by the result.
Some may fault the Jacober court for its judicial activism and argue
that the decision will encourage future courts to engage in judicial
legislation. However, the unusual circumstances of Jacober should
foreclose broad application of the law.
The current Rule is likely to promote more professional conduct in
the courtroom by eliminating the opportunity for the stonewalling
techniques that expert witnesses formerly employed to circumvent the
former rule.218 This change will provide for more efficient, and,
therefore, more expedient trials. Additionally, the current rule has the
211. Ruth v. Fenchel, 121 a.2d 373 (N.J. 1956), rev'd, Jacober v. St. Peter's Medical Ctr., 608
A.2d 304.
212. 35 A. 915 (N.J. 1896).
213.: 121 A.2d 373.
214. Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (1930), reprinted in LAW AND AMERICAN
HISTORY, supra note 73, at 706.
215. Jacober, 608 A.2d at 306.
216. Fed K Evid. 803 (18).
217. See id, advisory committee's note.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 172-175.
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potential to further the interests of public policy by making hospitals
and medical personnel more accountable. If medical practitioners
deviate from the acceptable medical standard, they will not be able to
depend on the performance of their experts to prevent the truth from
emerging. This development will place parties to a malpractice suit in
more equitable positions.
Ann St. Ledger

